LB 

1053 

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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS BULLETIN 

Vol. VII. OCTOBER 17, 1909 No. 7 

f Entered Feb. 14, 1902, at Urbana, 111., as second class matter under Act of Congress July 16, 1894] 



UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

SCHOOL OF EDUCATION 

* 

BULLETIN NO. 2 

SOME FACTS IN PARTIAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE 
SO-CALLED -DOGMA OF DISCIPLINE 



BY 



STEPHEN S. COLVIN 
Professor of Psychologj', University of Illinois 







.i^ 



URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, ILLINOIS 

PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY 




Glass \T:) '05^ 

Book AlZ- 



UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

SCHOOL OF EDUCATION 

BULLETIN NO. 2 

SOME FACTS IN PARTIAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE 
SO-CALLED DOGMA OF DISCIPLINE 



BY 



STEPHEN S. COLVIN 
Professor of Psychology, University of Illinois 




URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, ILLINOIS 

PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY 



Gift 



V 



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SOME FACTS IN PARTIAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE 
SO-CALLED DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 

I. The Statement of the Problem 5 

II. Experimental Evidence Relating to the Problem . . . 8 

III. The Possibility of Forming a Generalized Habit . . 17 

IV. Rules for Securing Transfer ...... 24 

V. The Superior Disciplinary Value of Pure as Compared 

with Applied Science . . . • • . . 26 



INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 

This paper substantially as printed was read before the Illi- 
nois School Masters' Club at Peoria, Oct. 8, 1909. On the follow- 
ing morning the question of formal discipline was discussed. Pres- 
ident David Felmley of the Illinois State Normal University, 
leading. There seemed to be a substantial agreement that trans- 
fer of training was possible to a greater or less degree, and 
that it was best accomplished by making the habit set up a 
conscious end of action. President Felmley disagreed with the 
speaker of the previous evening chiefly on two points : (1) That 
a "generalized" habit was possible and (2) That pure science had 
a superior value to applied science. In the light of President 
Felmley's discussion these two topics in the paper have been 
slightly amplified. Otherwise the paper is printed as read. 

University of Illinois, Nov. 15, 1909. 



I. THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. 

In the early years of the nineteenth century Gall and his pu- 
pil Spurzheim gave to the world theAnatomie et physiologie d/u 
systeme nerveuw, in which is to be found a detailed exposition of 
Gall's System of Phrenology. According to this system the brain 
is supposed to contain more than thirty separate and individual or- 
gans which are the seat of the most complex psychic capacities, 
or internal senses, such as combativeness, the fear-of-God, a sense- 
of-fact, the impluse-of-self-preservation, philoprogenitiveness, 
and the sense-of-language. It was only an incident to this system 
that the locality of these internal senses was found on the surface 
of the brain, and that the external evidence for them existed in 
certain prominences on the skull. The interest in this now biz- 
arre theory lies as far as the discussion of this evening is con- 
cerned, in the fact that here we find in a most pronounced form 
two basal assumptions, one of which has served as a convenient 
vehicle for the justification of the dogma of formal discipline, 
while the other lies, in part at least, at the basis of the theories 
of those who in their reaction against this dogma have gone in 
the other direction to extremes which seem equally absurd and 
incapable of justification. The first of these assumptions is that 
the mind is composed of a number of separate faculties, and from 
this it readily followed that these can be educated in their entirety 
and made to serve in the various situations of life equally well for 
all purposes. The second assumption has looked upon the va- 
rious activities of the nervous system, particularly of the cortex, 
as highly specialized and definitely localized, and has viewed the 
corresponding psychic functions as something quite discrete and 
separate. Carried to its logical extreme it would seem to 
imply that, for example, there is not only a cortical centre for 
language, but a distinct area for nouns, or for verbs, or what 
not; not only a cortical centre for vision, but a definite area for 
color; then why not for all the thirty-two thousand color quali- 
ties which the eye can sense? There seems to be no limit to the 
multiplication of centres which can result from such a theory, 
and it surely serves as a firm foundation for the doctrine that 
there is no education in general, and that the best we can do is to 
train the individual to interpret a certain number of definite 
sense stimuli and to respond to a limited number of concrete situ- 
ations in the same old way. The faculty psychology assumed a 



6 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

number of fabulous entities which worked out the destinies of the 
individual, while the doctrine of absolute localization of nervous 
function has made the brain a machine of relatively unrelated 
parts and has created a doctrine of psychic atomism which is as 
untrue as it is impossible of practical application. 

The faculty psychology of the last century is long since dead, 
and its resting place has almost been forgotten by the scientist of 
today ; its ghost, however, stalks abroad among the masses, and its 
spirit still lives in the pedagogical theories of many an uncritical 
thinker. From this faculty psychology it is no far cr^ to the 
dogma of formal discipline in all its purity. The assumptions it 
contains are well expressed by a clergyman quoted by Prof. James 
m the first volume of his larger Psychology : "As for my memory'* 
writes the clergyman, "it has improved year by year .... like a 
gymnast's muscle". This is a favorite comparison, the likening 
of memory, or attention or any other supposed psychic faculty U 
a muscle that can be developed for any use by any kind of exer- 
cise, and that is made equally strong by rowing, or boxing, or 
chopping wood, provided that the exercise is vigorous enough; 
and having been made strong by one exercise, can be used equally 
well for all activities. No less a scientist than Helmholtz is quoted 
by Coover and AngelP as valuing particularly certain studies as a 
means of intellectual training since these studies taxed "equally 
all the intellectual powers". Here we have the doctrine of form- 
al discipline and its pedagogical consequence expressed definitely 
and clearly. The implication of Helmholtz assumption seems 
to be that there are definite mental powers and that these powers 
can be developed in all directions by certain well chosen studies. 

Bagley in his Educative Process^ puts the matter concretely 
in this way ; "Certain subjects of the curriculum, if properly pur- 
sued, were believed to develop what might be termed 'generalized' 
habits. For example, a pupil may acquire a specific habit of pro- 
ducing neat papers in arithmetic. The doctrine of formal disci- 
pline assumes that if this habit is once thoroughly established, it 
will function equally well in connection with language and draw- 
ing; that, functioning successfully here, it cannot fail to insure 
neatness of person and attire and that the habit of neatness thus 
ingrained upon the pupil will surely be carried into mature 
years." 

^American Journal of Psychology, VoL XVIII, pages 328-340 (1907). 
•Chapter XIII, page 203. 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 7 

Thus it is assumed that there is a general faculty or habit of 
neatness, and that this when trained by one set of exercises, will 
be serviceable in all the specific situations in life where neatness 
may be employed. Stated thus the dogma of formal discipline is 
absolutely untenable. There is no general faculty of neatness, 
nor of any mental capacity, and if there were such an entity, 
training it to function in one direction would not mean that it 
was trained equally well to function in all directions. If there 
was nothing more to the doctrine of formal discipline than the 
old faculty psychology, or the thought that training in one direc- 
tion can be transferred equally well in all directions, I should 
not attempt even a partial justification of it here. It is quite 
obvious and beyond argument that training in mathematical 
reasoning does not necessarily mean ability to reason equally 
well in the affairs of every day life ; it seems certain that if I wish 
to increase my ability to discriminate between shades of gray, the 
best training is to attempt such discriminations and not, for ex- 
ample, to practice discriminating between intensities of sound. 
It is a vastly different matter to affirm, however, that mathemat- 
ical reasoning has no effect on other rational processes, and that 
as far as distinguishing shades of gray is concerned it is quite in- 
different whether the person has had previous training in sensory 
discrimination in other fields. To affirm that when the mind is 
trained in one direction it is first of all trained in that direction 
and not in some other is one thing; to affirm, however, that the 
training in one direction has no influence in other direction is 
quite a different affair. No one, I think, would be quite so rash 
as to make the latter assertion; but many would believe that 
such a transfer of training is in most instances slight, and in some 
cases such a transfer is not probable, even in the slightest degree. 
Some seem to assume that about all that education can hope to 
do is to give to the pupil certain facts in a limited department of 
knowledge, and to habituate him to definite reactions in a cir- 
cumscribed field of human activity. They seem to despair of any 
education in general that amounts to much. Having, however^ 
admitted the possibility of transfer from one field to another, never 
mind how little, they are incapable of determining a priori how 
great this transfer may be and what general effects it may have. 
Such persons may try to bring some definiteness into their con- 
ceptions as to the extent of this transfer, by saying that such a 
transfer can take place only where there is a similar situation, 
and where like elements are involved ; but it must be remembered 



« , UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

til at similarity and likeness are not primarily objective categories, 
but that they are constituted by the mind of the person who finds 
such similarity or likeness, and that it is never certain before- 
hand just where this similarity and likeness is to be found. 

Such a contention can be determined only by actual tests 
either in life itself, or in the psychological experiment. Fortu- 
nately we have had in the last few years a considerable number 
of such experiments reported, and the light which they throw on 
the whole question of formal discipline is more illuminating than 
that which can be secured from a discussion of a priori assump- 
tions, or 'half-baked' psychological theories. I therefore turn to 
them and call the most important of them briefly to your atten- 
tion. 

II. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE 

PROBLEM. 

The two pieces of experimental evidence which have probably 
had the most influence in descrediting the doctrine of formal dis- 
cipline and in over-emphasizing the opposite doctrine are those 
of Prof. James of two decades ago, and the more recent series in- 
spired by Prof, ^horndike of Columbia University. James in his 
chapter on Memory in the larger Psychology^ says : All improve- 
ment of memory consists, then, in the improvement of one's hahit- 
ual methods of recording facts. By this he means to deny that 
there is any improvement in memory-power as such, the improve- 
ment being solely due to the method or the technique of memoriz- 
ing. He then gives in a footnote a description of certain tests 
carried on by himself in support of his assertion. Since these 
tests are the first of a considerable number of later experiments 
conducted in a similar way, I will venture here to give a brief 
description of their general nature. Like those that have been 
undertaken later by other investigators, the essential technique 
of these earliest experiments consisted in giving the subject of the 
test some material to learn, thereby determining his capacity 
for learning as measured by a certain standard. The material for 
this first learning constitutes what is termed the "test series" ; it 
is followed by a period of practice in learning some other kind of 
material and this second material is known as the "practice se- 
ries" ; this practice series is then followed by another learning of 
the material of the test series, and the improvement or lack of 

"Vol. 1, page 667. 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 9 

improvement over the first trials gives a measure of the effect of 
the practice series on the ability to learn. 

To take a concrete case, James tested himself by learning on 
eight successive days 150 lines of Victor Hugo's 'Satyr'. He 
says : "The total number of minutes required for this was 131 5-6 
— it should be said that I had learned nothing by heart for many 
years. I then, working for twenty-odd minutes daily, learned the 
entire first book of Paradise Lost, occupying 38 consecutive days 
in the process". He then went back to the learning of Victor 
Hugo and found that while before the training he had learned at 
the rate of one line in 50 seconds, after the training he learned 
at the slower rate of one line in 57 seconds. James added that 
during the second learning series he was perceptibly fagged with 
other work, which of course, invalidated the entire experiment. 

Other persons under Professor James' direction carried on 
similar experiments under somewhat better conditions and the re- 
sults showed a slight positive effect of the training. 

These experiments are today chiefly of historical interest. 
They were not carried on under the strictest experimental condi- 
tions and are valuable mainly as pioneer investigations in the 
field. They are important also because their conclusions were 
given to the world with the tremendous authority that the ipse 
dixit of their author has always carried. Thus they have done 
much to reform the entire notion of the possibilities of memory 
training and of training in general. 

The second set of experiments which I have mentioned above 
as having had an important pedagogical consequence are those of 
Thorndike and Woodworth^ reported under the title. The Influ- 
ence of Improvement in One Mental Function upon the Efficien- 
cy of Other Functions. Tests were conducted to determine the 
influence of the training in the estimation of magnitudes on the 
ability to estimate magnitudes of the same general sort ; the influ- 
ence of training in estimating weights, on the ability to estimate 
the weight of miscellaneous objects of similar weight ; and the in- 
fluence of the practice in marking words containing certain letters 
on the marking of words containing other letters, misspelled 
words, et cetera. 

In these varied tests most of the subjects showed some im- 
provement when tested after the practice series. Thorndike's 
general conclusion is that while there is some transfer it is not 
due to any "mysterious transfer of practice , to an unanalyzable 

' ^Psychological Review, Vol. VIII, pages 247-261; 348-395; 553-564. 



10 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

property of mental functions", but rather to a transfer of identi- 
cal elements from the practice series to the final test series. This 
transfer on the whole does not seem to be great, and its spread is 
limited largely to activities that closely resemble one another. 
Thorndike's experiments have been criticised as giving results in 
part at varience with his conclusions, and as lacking entirely in 
introspective analysis, making it difficult to interpret the true 
significance of the numerical results. 

Another experimental study which seems to point in part to 
the same general conclusions as those of Thorndike and Wood- 
worth was conducted also at Columbia University by Bair^. This 
experimenter made an extensive investigation and analysis of the 
practice curve. The writer, however, concludes that '^'any bit of 
special training also helps us to receive training in general. Any 
training helps us to find ourselves. It gives us a method of orien- 
tation which leaves us in our reactions not entirely at the mercy 
of chance even in unfamiliar situations. The experience which 
we get from special training gives us a general power to meet an 
entirely new situation with a more favorable response than had 
we not had this special training". 

Among the earlier experiments, the transfer of training from 
one specific set of reactions to another was investigated under 
the direction of Scripture in the psychological laboratory at Yale 
University^. The first series of experiments considered the in- 
crease of muscular steadiness through practice in inserting a 
needle in a very small hole, and the transfer of this increase to the 
corresponding muscles of the opposite half of the body. The left 
hand was tested first and showed 50 per cent of correct trials, but 
after practice with the right hand for ten days the left hand 
sliowed 76 per cent of successes. Scripture explains these results 
as due primarily to a training of the attention rather than to any 
carrying over of skill in adjustment. Experiments on the in- 
crease of muscular power after practice showed " a steady in- 
crease in the muscular power of the right hand due to practice 
and also an increase in the power of the left hand due to what 
might be called 'indirect practice' ". 

^ColumMa University, Contributions to PMlosopTii/, Psychology and Educa- 
tion, Vol. IX (1902). 

'On the education of muscular control and power, E. W. Scripture, T. L. 
Smith, and Emily M. Brown, Studies from the Yale Psychological Laboratory, 
Vol. II, pages 105-114, (1894). Also Researches in cross-education by Walter W. 
Davis; ibid. Vol. VI, pages 6-50 (1898) and VIII, pages 64-109 (1900). 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE H 

Further experiments conducted by Davis under Scripture's 
direction on the rapidity of tapping a telegraph key showed im- 
provement through practice not only for the part of the bodv 
practiced but for other members as well. Experiments in 
strength of voluntary efPort in lifting dumbells showed a trans- 
ferrence of the effects of practice from the right to the left arm 
and m muscular development and endurance. Experiments in 
lunging at a target with a fencer's foil showed that practice with 
the right hand affected the left hand positively. Accordincr to 
Davis the results of the experiments showed not only that eff'^ects 
of exercise may be transferred, but also that "will power and at- 
tention are educated by physical training and that when devel- 
oped by any special act they are developed for all other acts". 

Later Judd^ carried on a series of experiments on the effect 
of practice without knowledge of results. 

The person tested was required to judge the length of certain 
lines and he was seated in such a position that his right hand 
and arm were entirely hidden from view by a large screen What- 
ever he did with his right hand was, therefore, unseen by him. 
On the left side of the screen and in full view, nine different lines 
were shown m succession, and he was required to place a pencil 
held m the unseen right hand in the direction indicated by the 
several lines seen before him". After this the reactor was given 
"fuller visual experience" with one line and an improvement at 
once took place in regard to this line. This improvement Avas 
found to be transferred by later test to the other lines, but in 
some instances this transfer was negative. The lines that in the 
original series had shown an error similar to that of the line with 
which fuller visual experience had been obtained, showed a posi- 
tive improvement in the test series, those in which the error had 
been m an oppisite direction grew worse. In both cases, how- 
ver, there were clear evidences of a transfer effect, but in the 
second case the transfer was negative. 

In a second series of tests, geometrical figures were compared 
Because of an illusion, one of these was over estimated, another 
underestimated. During the experiment one observer was kept 
m Ignorance of the results, while the other was fuiiv informed 
Then the figures were reversed and a second series of tests were 
negun. In this the observer who knew the effect of practice a d- 
'These experiments are reported in the Psychological Review, Vol. IX, pages 
27-30 (1902); also in a symposium on formal discipline in the Educational Re-^- 
view, June 1908. 



12 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

justed himself to the new conditions. The other observer who did 
not know the effects showed a greater error than at any time, and 
was unable to improve, because, as Judd believes, the habit had 
now became so firmly fixed that training could no longer modify 
the reaction. 

A similar test was later carried on with school children, who 
were required to hit a target placed under water. This was diffi- 
cult because of the deflection of the light through refraction. In 
the test one group was instructed in the nature of refraction, while 
the others were kept in ignorance. The boys in this test who had 
been instructed did no better than the others, but in a second test 
in which the depth of the target in the water was reduced from 
twelve inches to four, the boys who had the theory fitted them- 
selves quickly to the new conditions, while with the other group 
the errors were large and persistent. These experiments clearly 
show the value of a knowledge of conditions in connection with 
the transfer of training. 

A somewhat analogous fact is brought out by Ruediger in a 
test reported in the Educational Review^ for November, 1908. 
Huediger's experiment was suggested by Bagley's results^ with 
children tested at the Montana State Normal College. Bagley 
attempted "to determine whether the habit of producing neat 
papers in arithmetic will function with reference to neat written 
•w^ork in other studies". He states that "the results are almost 
startling in their failure to show the slightest improvement in 
language and spelling papers, although the improvement in the 
arithmetic papers was noticeable from the first." Ruediger's tests 
were carried on for eight weeks in three different schools, all of 
the seventh grade. He found that when the emphasis on neatness 
in one subject was accompanied by talks to pupils on neatness, 
so that the habit was raised to clear consciousness, decided im- 
jjrovement was shown in subjects no more closely related than 
geography, arithmetic, grammar, and history. In other words, 
the habit was constructed into an ideal and a transfer was thus 
made which seemed entirely lacking when the whole procedure 
was on the level of the subconscious. This matter will be brought 
up again in a later part of the discussion. 

Another important series of experiments on transfer was 
conducted a few years ago by Coover and AngelP^ on the general 

'Improvement of mental functions through ideals. 

'The Educative Process, Chap. XIII, p. 208. 

^"American Jowrndl of Psychology, Vol. XVIII, pages 328-340 (1907). 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 13 

practice effects of special exercises. In one experiment the train- 
ing series consisted in the discrimination of sound intensities, the 
test series in discriminating shades of gray. A clear transfer of 
the practice effect was shown, as was also the case in a lesser de- 
gree in a second test in which the training series consisted in 
sorting cards and the test series in typewriter reactions. The au- 
thors conclude from; the objective results and the introspections 
of the subjcts that the improvement consists in "divesting the 
essential process of the unessential factors. There is a greater 
habituation and more economical adaption of attention." 

Franker^ ^ recently carried on a series of experiments on the 
transference of training in memory in the psychological labora- 
tory of the State University of Iowa. The same general methods 
in the use of training and practice series were employed as in the 
previous experiments cited. 

The training series consisted in memorizing the order of four 
tones. The test series were eight in number as follows: (1) 
memory for poetry; (2) memory for the order of four shades of 
gray; (3) memory for the order of nine tones; (4) memory for 
the order of nine shades of gray; (5) memory for the order of 
four tones ; ( 6 ) memory for the order of nine geometrical figures ; 
(7) memory for the order of nine numbers; (8) memory for the 
extent of arm movement. Clear indication of transfer was found, 
generally more marked in those cases where the test series and 
the practice series were similar, although it sometimes happened 
as in Thorndike's experiments that improvement was not noted in 
some cases where there was great similarity between the practice 
and test series; indeed, the practice seemed to have a negative ef- 
fect. The results of the experiment did not, however, support 
Thorndike's contention that "improvement in any single mental 
function rarely brings about equal improvement in any other 
function, no matter how similar". In many cases Franker found 
that improvement was absolutely greater in amount in the test 
than in the training series. During the experiment the intro- 
spections of the observers were carefully recorded and they indi- 
cate that mental imagery and properly controlled attention have 
much to do with the transfer. 

Another investigation of some importance in clearly in- 
dicating the existence of transf er is that of Winch^^ who gave his 

"TTie Psychological Review Monograph Supplements, Vol. IX, No. 2, pages 
56-102. 

"British Journal of Psychology^ Vol. II, p. 284. 



14 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

observers as a test series, the learning of selections from an his- 
torical reader and as a training series the committing of poetry. 
More than one hundred children were tested. The investigator 
concludes that "improvement gained by practice in memorizing 
one subject of instruction, is transferred to the memory work in 
other subjects whose nature is certainly diverse from that in 
which the improvement was gained". Rote memory can certainly 
be improved. 

Among minor investigations and observations bearing more 
or less directly on the problem of the evening's discussion may be 
mentioned Volkmann's^^ tests of a half century ago on the influ- 
ence of practice on spatial discrimination. He investigated the 
fineness of space discrimination on the skin by means of the Weber 
compass and found that practice with the finger tips of the left 
hand increased the fineness of discrimination of the finger tips of 
the right hand, but not of the left fore-arm. Practice with the 
third phalanx increased the fineness of discrimination on the first 
phalanx. 

Also of interest are the investigations of Urbantschisch, of 
Epstein and of Vogt cited by Coover and AngeP^. Urbantsch- 
isch found that a sound stimuls increased the sensitivity of the 
subject for visual, gustatory, olfactory and tactile stimuli. Sim- 
ilar results are reported by Epstein in regard to the relation be- 
tween auditory and visual stimuli. Vogt showed that habitua- 
tion to distractions in one situation could be carried over to other 
fields. 

A i^iece of work bearing less directly on the question of trans- 
fer but yet indicating something in regard to mental correlations 
which may be variously interpreted, was recently conducted at the 
University of Illinois by H. L. Rietz and Imogene Shade^^. This 
concerned itself with inquiring into "the facts of correlation be- 
tween the efficiency of students in mathematics and their efficien- 
cy in (1) foreign languages, (2) natural science". The method of 
investigation may be characterized in a general way as that of Gal- 
ton and Pearson. The source of the data is the records of the reg- 
istrar of the University of Illinois. The results of the investiga- 
tion are, in brief, that "a high correlation exists between efficiency 
in mathematics and natural sciences, and also between efficiency 

^^Bericht d. k. sdchs.. Ges. d. Wissenschaft, 1858. 
"Op. cit. p. 328. 

"Correlation of eflaciency in mathematics and efficiency in other subjects. 
The Univ. of Illinois Studies, Vol. VI., No. 10, (1908). 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 15 

in mathematics and foreign languages". While the results here 
do not in any way indicate whether there has been a transfer of 
training in mathematics to the other subjects they seem to show 
that studies as far apart as mathematics and foreign language 
evidently have many points in common, so that training in one 
subject might very well be made effective in the other. 

I have reserved for consideration until the last, one of the 
most extensive and important series of experiments relating to the 
question of transfer of training^ ^, namely those of Ebert and 
Meumann. These tests, though with a greatly improved 
technique and with a larger number of subjects, are in gen- 
eral like the pioneer investigations conducted by James, 
The results, however, are decidedly different and the conclusions 
arrived at by Meumann are on the whole at variance with those of 
James. At the beginning of the Meumann tests, the memories of 
the subjects were determined for nonsense syllables, numbers, 
letters, one-syllabled substantives, Italian words, poetic words, 
prose words, and visual signs. In the training series which fol- 
lowed, the subjects were given nonsense syllables to memorize and 
then the original test series was repeated to determine improve- 
ment, if any, both for immediate recall and for permanent reten- 
tion. In some cases the experiment was carried still farther, a 
second training series followed by another test series being intro- 
duced. The special training with nonsense syllables evidently in- 
creased the ability of the subjects to memorize and retain the 
materials of the test series. The amount of the transfer was 
found to be great. The ability to memorize philosophic prose, for 
example, showed an increase of 70 per cent after the practice se- 
ries, and to memorize visual signs 55 per cent. Ebert and Meii- 
mann consider that increased power of attending, increase in vol- 
untary effort, improvement in the technique of learning and gen- 
eral decrease in discomfort and tediousness are the chief auxiliary 
causes for the improvement after practice. They believe, how- 
ever, that beyond these conditions and fundamental to the process 
of transfer, lies a sympathetic interaction of allied memory func- 
tions, based on an assumed psychophysical activity. The exist- 
ence of such an uncertain relationship is denied by the reviewers 
of this piece of work. Both Miiller and Dearborn, who have criti- 
cized these experiments, believe that the transfer can be best ex- 
plained by considering the so-called auxiliary aids as the sole cause 
of the results obtained . Be this as it may, Ebert and Meumann, 

"ArcTi. /. d. gesamte PsycJiol.. VoL IV. 



16 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

experienced investigators of high scholarship, have found that 
so mechanical a procedure as memorizing nonsense syllables has 
a pronounced effect on learning in general. Whatever the explan- 
ation may be, the results seem beyond reasonable dispute, both on 
account of the ability of the investigators and the unequivocal 
nature of their findings. 

I have spent, perhaps, an undue amount of time in attempt- 
ing to present the above experimental evidence. It has been my 
wish, however, to avoid as much as possible, speculation, hypothe- 
!«is, and conjecture, and get down to the basis of undoubted facts. 
There can be no dispute, I think, in regard to the significance of 
these facts. Transfer is indicated in practically all of the experi- 
ments, and in some, particularly in the last described, this transfer 
is striking. The only investigations which showed no transfer 
were those of James, performed admittedly under unsatisfactory 
conditions, and the tests of Bagley in the Montana Normal 
School. Bagley's experiments, however, when continued under 
somewhat different conditions, as conducted by Ruediger, show 
clear evidence of transfer. Of the remaining experiments those 
of Thorndike show the least positive result. 

I take it that in the light of all the evidence there cannot be 
the slightest doubt that practice effects may be, and generally are, 
transferred from one set of activities to another. The extent of 
such transfer and the conditions under which it takes place are, 
however, matters for further investigation and of great pedagogi- 
cal significance. Whether the results are due to transfer of iden- 
tical elements (Thorndike) ; to improvement of habitual methods 
of recording facts (James) ; to training the attention and will- 
power (Scripture and Davis) ; to devesting the essential process 
of the unessential factors, greater habituation and more economic- 
al adaptation of attention (Coover and Angell) ; to the effective 
use of mental imagery and properly controlled attention (Frank- 
er) ; to the development of ideals (Bagley and Ruediger) ; 
to general improvement in technique of learning, attention and 
will-power, but chiefly to a sympathetic interaction of allied mem- 
ory functions (Ebert and Meumann), or to some other factors as 
yet not analyzed out, may still be a matter of investigation and 
debate. My own personal opinion is that practically all of these 
are more or less important elements in the transfer. 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 17 

III. THE POSSIBILITIES OF FORMING A GENERAL 

HABIT. 

Although the evidence of transfer seems unequivocal the ex- 
treme anti-formalist may still insist that the results of the investi- 
gations above cited are misleading and declare on theoretical 
grounds that any general transfer of training is impossible, since 
there is no such thing as a "generalized" habit. As Bagley puts 
it, "A simple habit is a specific response to a specific stimulus; a 
generalized habit would be a specific response common to a num- 
ber of different stimuli". As such, "the term is a psychological 
absurdity". In a similar vein Thorndike asserts that "the mind is 
on its dynamic side a machine for making particular reactions to 
particular situations. It works in great detail, adapting itself to 
special data of which it has had experience". The case seems 
very simple. A habit is a definite response to a definite stimulus, 
and as all training tends to the formation of habits, there can be 
no training that is not specific. This line of reasoning might seem 
all very well if it did not prove too much. If habit is of this de- 
cidedly specific character, then it would seem to follow of neces- 
sity that the aim of the process of learning is merely to make facile 
and subconscious those things which have already been done after 
a fashion, and not to prepare the individual properly to react to 
essentially new situations. If this were the case we should be in- 
a sorry plight indeed. We should be obliged to revise all our 
former notions of an education, and substitute for our present 
procedure a narrow and illiberal training, habituating the pupil 
to a limited sphere of predetermined activities. The child would 
be but little better off, then, in his learning processes than is the 
brute, who manifestly is trained in just such a manner as de- 
scribed and is in no sense educated. Thorndike attempts to es- 
cape from this obvious difficulty by admitting the transfer of 
training through elements identical in two situations. 

Such a transfer in the simplest form is well illustrated by a 
series of experiment carried on several years ago in the psycholog- 
ical laboratory of the University of Illinois. In these experi- 
ments three dogs among other animals were tested in regard to 
their ability to discriminate between various colors. Throughout 
most of the experiments a standard red was the color which they 
were trained to associate with the obtaining of food. This color 
was painted on the food-box, and the dogs soon formed the habit 
of reacting directly to this red-box stimulus, thus obtaining their 



18 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

food. Later one of the dogs was tested to see how far he could as- 
sociate the color red when presented not merely on a box of a cer- 
tain size and appearance but on various receptacles and under 
various conditions, with the obtaining of food. Gradually this 
dog was trained to recognize the color red under varied condi- 
tions as the food signal. Thus, quite mechanically, he seems to 
have transferred his habit from one situation to another through 
the identity of the color element in the various situations. Such 
a transfer is not of a high type, nor is it very promising from the 
standpoint of educational procedure. The possibilities of getting 
much general training through the identity of objective elements 
in a total situation do not seem to be great. It should be stated, 
however, that Thorndike understands by identical elements not 
only identity of the objective stimulus as in the cease of the food- 
box stimulus, but the identity of those elements that constitute 
the reaction to a stimulus, the identity of adjustment in two sit- 
uations. 

Bagley has got around the difficulty much better by emphasiz- 
ing the identity or similarity of certain subjective elements in a 
situation (indeed he would define a situation in terms of con- 
scious meaning rather than in terms of objective elements) in 
his doctrine of a transfer through the creation of ideals. He says 
in regard to the habit of neatness, for example, that "those who 
appear to carry this habit over from one department of life to 
another really carry over the ideal of neatness." The importance 
of this general principle, thus formulated by Bagley, cannot be 
overestimated, yet I am inclined to believe that neither this, nor 
the principle of identical elements as set forth by Thorndike is 
sufficient to explain all there is in the transfer, nor to exhaust the 
possibilities of a general training. 

In several senses I believe that we are warranted in speaking 
of a generalized habit. Such an expression seems to me admis- 
sable under the following conditions : 

(1.) When the specific stimulus that calls forth a specific re- 
action is common to a large variety of situations, which situations 
may have little in common beyond the presence in each of the spe- 
cific stimulus. In the case of the food-box reaction, for example, 
described above, the color red was the element in the many situa- 
tions which produced under varying circumstances the fool-seek- 
ing response. Such a reaction would be general in the sense that 
it could take place under may objective conditions, and thus as far 
as the environment is concerned, constitute a generalized re- 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 19 

sponse through the similarity or identity of a single element in 
that environment. Take another example of a similar sort : The 
soldier who has learned to come to attention at the word of com- 
mand will do so on the parade ground, the battlefield or the street. 
It, of course, may be said that for the soldier who so responds the 
actual situation is the same under these varying conditions. 
However, this is true only as far as the dominant element in the 
situation remains similar, this dominant element being deter- 
mined not only by its objective importance to the ordinary ob- 
server, but by the fact that the soldier does thus react under va- 
rious circumstances (the reaction thus being the criterion of iden- 
tity of stimulus.) For the ordinary observer, however, this dom- 
inant element may be of but slight importance, and thus in his re- 
lations with his fellowmen, the soldier may appear to have ac- 
quired a generalized habit and for all practical purposes his reac- 
tion may be treated as such. 

(2) There is another class of habitual reactions which do 
not seem to be called forth by any definite objective stimulus, but 
which appear under a large variety of objective conditions in 
which no single common element can be found. These latter cases 
arise when the reaction is under the dominance of a mood or emo- 
tion that so colors the objective environment that several dijfferent 
stimuli may call forth the habitual response. A person, for ex- 
ample, of a choleric disposition may have established a very defi- 
nite set of reactions which habitually expresses his angry moods. 
The insignificant external causes which set off this definite re- 
sponse may vary greatly and it may thus be urged, that not one 
stimulus, but many, are capable of producing the reaction. In 
cases of morbid pity, irrational fear, religious enthusiasm, and 
the like, the object which gives expression to these moods is ap- 
parently indifferent. Of course it may be replied that the mood it- 
self is due to a complex of bodily stimuli (such as those set forth 
in the James-Lange theory of the emotions) and what really is 
true is that in all the habitual expressions of the emotion there 
exist certain common and definite stimuli discharging themselves 
into the higher centres, and that this second class of habitual re- 
sponses really belongs with the first class, mainly of response to 
identical stimuli. Whether this is theoretically true or not, we 
again have, and to a greater extent than in the cases cited under 
the first class, what may be practically considered as a very gen- 
eral response to a large number of different environmental condi- 
tions. 



20 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

(3) We further have in any definite reaction to a given sit- 
uation not merely one elemental adjustment, but generally many 
both positive and negative. This the following discussion will at- 
tempt to make clear : 

Let us suppose that a child in the school room is being taught 
to correctly form the letter a in his copy book. Here we have the 
example of training in a special habit. We have a certain defi- 
nite stimulus of sight, namely the letter a of the copy book, which 
constitutes the essential stimulus to which there is a specific re- 
sponse, the writing of the letter a. This gradually becomes more 
and more an habitual process and we have set up a definite habit 
of stimulus and response. I wish to submit, however, that besides 
this specific stimulus of the written or printed a on the copy book, 
there are other stimuli which constitute the total situation which 
might function just as well for copying h, or any other letter, as a. 
We have not merely the specific d-copying reaction but we have 
as well a more general reaction based on the seeing of the copy 
book, the "feel" of the pen in the hand, etc., which may be termed 
the "copy-book" reaction ; beyond this we have a still more general 
group of motor expressions and exhibitions which constitute the 
"school" reaction as such and differentiate it from the "home" re- 
action, for example. Now in the copying of the letter a all these 
various reactions are involved, but only a very small part of the 
total reaction functions solely for the a-copying habit ; much of it 
might function equally well for the reading-habit, or the number- 
work habit. There is then a considerable part of the «-copying 
habit that is not specific in the sense that it is confined to the one 
particular reaction of copying the a. It is general in the sense 
that it concerns itself with many other school activities. For ex- 
ample, the ignoring of the noises on the street, the holding of the 
body in the proper position at the desk, etc., are reactions that 
apply to various school situations other than the one concerned 
with the business of copying the a. 

Perhaps this thought may be made more clear by the accom- 
panying diagram. In this the script letters a, h, y, z, represent cer- 
tain specific activities in which the pupil is being trained. « , how- 
ever, involves the more general adjustment W, w^hich in turn in- 
volves the still more general adjustment S. Now while in the 
activity a, W and S are both involved, these may also be involved 
equally well in still other activities. For example, W is involved 
among other things in the activity b, while S is involved not only 
in W, but in R as well. To be more concrete, let us suppose that 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 



21 




22 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

a represents the a-copying habit, and W the writing habit and 
S the school habit, while R represents the reading habit and y the 
habit of reading in verse. Now it is quite obvious that in learn- 
ing to copy a^ the other higher habits, if they have not already 
been formed, will of necessity gradually be set up. Suppose the 
child should begin his activities in school (which of course, he 
actually would not) by learning to copy the letter a. In this ac- 
tivity he would gradually acquire the more fundamental habit of 
paying attention in the school room and of the general technique 
of learning to write. Thus in learning to copy the a^ he would 
have also acquired a stock of habits which could be transferred to 
other school situations. In other words, learning to copy a 
would constitute a general training as well as a specific habit- 
forming activity. 

So we are justified in speaking of general habits of attending, 
or of thinking, or of willing, although as Bagley would urge with 
justice, attention, thought and resolution are mental states, which 
as highly conscious, raise the individual above the plane of habit- 
ual activities, and make it possible for him to respond in a new 
way to a new situation. The fact, however, that he does attend, 
has the attitude of attention, is due to certain specific tendencies 
toward reaction which have been gradually acquired and made 
reflex. The attending to the dictation of the teacher, for ex- 
ample, brings into the consciousness of the child a situation to 
which he may intelligently react, but the possibility of getting the 
attitude of this attention is largely dependent on many subcon- 
scious and habitual factors, such as ignoring unessential stimuli, 
disregarding tedium, and in general having developed a technique 
of learning. These elements have been emphasized by most of the 
investigators above cited as essential in the process of transfer. 

If we consider again the diagram just discussed we shall be 
able to see how it explains some of the facts of transfer or its lack, 
as shown in investigations above considered. 

In one of the tests of Thorndike, for example, the subjects 
were given practice in marking the words on a printed page con- 
taining the two letters e and s. Before and after this training 
these subjects were tested in marking the words containing other 
combinations of letters, misspelled words, different parts of 
speech, etc. Improvement in the second test series was measured 
by increased speed and accuracy. In general speed was more 
likely to be improved than accuracy. The reason for this I think 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 2S 

is perfectly obvious in terms of our diagram, as can be seen from 
the following. Suppose that a represents the practice in marking 
the words containing e and s, while 6 represents the marking of 
words containing other letters, etc. It is quite obvious that the 
specific marking habit acquired in the first series, enters into con- 
flict in a certain sense with the marking of words containing m 
and I, for example, since the attention is turned from words of one 
general make-up in the practice series to those of another com- 
position, in the test series. Thus the acquired tendency to mark 
words containing e and s will actually tend to inhibit the marking 
of words containing m and I. Hence there may be a falling off in 
accuracy. On the other hand the more general reaction of mark- 
ing words has been trained at the same time as the habit of mark- 
ing specific words. This latter phase of the habit (which Thorn- 
dike would term an identical element, but which I prefer to call 
a more general attitude) may be transferred from the marking of 
one kind of word to the other. This might result in greater speed 
and at the same time diminished accuracy. I venture to say that 
if a subject had been trained to high eflflciency in the word-marking 
habit, further training in marking certain specific words would 
tend to exercise a negative infiuence in marking other words 
similar to them. The nearer the activities were alike in this case, 
the greater would be the distraction of attention, and the greater 
the falling off in efficiency. 

It would seem probable for this reason that highly trained 
laboratory subjects would show less general effect of training 
than would naive subjects, and that adults would show less ef- 
fect than w^ould children. The laboratory subject who has mas- 
tered the technique of giving himself over to the test at hand, who 
knows how to hold his attention down to the minimum of fluctua- 
tion and to overcome the loss of interest arising through ennui, 
can expect to get little general training in carrying on some spe- 
cific activity like judging areas, tapping at dots on paper, or 
learning nonsense syllables. The greatest possibilities of trans- 
ferring general attitudes of attention, thinking, etc., except as 
conscious ideals or purposes, lie, then, with untrained adults and 
with children, especially with the latter. This makes the edu- 
cative process so hopeful where children are concerned and rela- 
tively hopeless with adults. It is not that adults cannot learn 
new habits, as James maintains in his famous chapter on habit; 
it is that they cannot generalize these habits, that makes the man 
of forty an old fogy. 



24 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

Transfer of training is then possible in the ways indicated: 
(1) Where a single element to which a specific response is made 
functions under various environmental conditions because it 
is a common element in these various, and otherwise to a greater 
or less degree, dissimilar environments; (2) When a dominant 
mood or emotion so colors various environments that a charac- 
teristic response is obtained without identity of any one objec- 
tive condition; (3) Where a single response in reality involves 
other and more general adjustments. (4) It is also possible, 
as Bagley suggests, through making the end of the activity a 
clearly conscious ideal. In this case the transfer takes place by 
a direct carrying over by consciousness not of the activity itself, 
but of the purpose of the activity, to another field. This transfer 
may be represented in the diagram by the dotted lines from a to h 
from a to z, and so on, showing a direct transfer without involv- 
ing the adjustments at W, S, or K. To illustrate by a concrete 
example, the habit of attention in school (S) may function quite 
unconsciously, from having been acquired in the reading of poetry 
(y) ; in connection with the writing of certain letters in the copy- 
book (b), or it may function rather because the school-attention 
attitude has been made a conscious ideal in connection with y 
and is therefore carried over as an end of action rather than as a 
habit. This general scheme with this modification suggests, I 
believe, all the possibilities of transfer; general moods and atti- 
tudes that have grown up quite unconsciously as well as devel- 
oped conscious purposes finding their place in the transfer. 
Whether beyond this there is some mysterious sort of harmony, 
or sympathetic vibration, in the nervous system that makes it 
possible for one habit to set up another without a transfer in 
the ways suggested, we do not know. But if it exists it is buried 
at present so far below the threshold of consciousness that it has 
no practical educational significance and need not be considered 
here. 

IV. KULES FOR SECURING TRANSFER. 

The possibility of a general training is thus seemingly es- 
tablished both in theory and in fact, and it becomes the business 
of education to consider how such a training can best be secured. 
I believe that it is possible in the light of all the evidence present- 
ed on the subject of transfer to lay down with tolerable certainty 
a few rules of procedure. 

(1). The first rule should be: Make those specific activi- 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 25 

ties which you wish to transfer the object of thought. Let the 
significance of the habit and its general bearings become known 
to the person who is the subject of the training. Bagley has em- 
phasized this factor in training in his doctrine of transference 
through ideals, and the experiments of Ruediger seem to justify 
the contention. The results of Judd, who, as previously stated, 
has shown that practice with knowledge has a value in the trans- 
fer of training which practice without knowledge does not pos- 
sess, also point to the same general conclusion. Likewise, 
Meumann states that it is desirable in training children formally 
to bring to their attention the significance of such training. It 
further should be said that our knowledge of the functioning of 
the nervous system is in strict accord with this general position in 
regard to transfer, since the association fibres of the cortex are the 
ones which connect various sensory and motor areas and their 
function is probably primarily related to the higher conscious 
processes. 

It would seem then that we have a definite means which edu- 
cation can pursue in formal training, and this means removes the 
■criticism that such training is merely mechanical and deadening. 

(2) Train the child in the technique of learning and in the 
processes that make learning effective and economical. Nearly 
^11 the investigations emphasize the value of properly adapted at- 
tention, of satisfactory physical and mental attitudes in securing 
transfer. Sustained attention should be developed in the school 
training, not merely for the sake of the object attended to (per- 
haps not primarily for the object's sake), but rather for the sake 
of attention itself. The whole art of learning should be carefully 
and skillfully controlled. The importance of right method of 
learning has been emphasized in recent years largely through the 
work of Meumann. It appears that one of the chief aims of edu- 
cation should be to teach the child how to acquire knowledge with 
the least expenditure of time and energy compatible with its 
retention for effective use. Personally I am convinced that one 
of the greatest needs of formal training in this connection is the 
ilevelopment of the child's mental imagery. See to it that chil- 
dren can employ various kinds of imagery effectively, develop 
the imagery for form and for color, the imagery for sounds and 
for kinaesthetic sensation of throat, hand, and fingers when pos- 
sible. Many a poor reader cannot visualize, many a child defici- 
ent in nicety of motor control lacks kinaesthetic imagery; all 



26 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

training in musical notation is worthless knowledge unless the 
child has a fair auditory imagery. 

(3) In seeking to secure transfer, especially where pur- 
pose does not play an important part, see to it that the stimulus 
which is to call forth the desired reaction is such that it may be 
a common element in many objective situations. If, for exam- 
ple, it is desired to promote in general the habit of observation, it 
will be unwise to cultivate this habit in a very narrow and un- 
usual field of experience. Habits of observation may doubtless 
be secured by training the observer to give careful attention to 
objects appearing under the miscroscope. This training in ob- 
servation will on the whole probably have less possibilities of 
transfer to other fields than observation cultivated in the study 
of more common objects of life, such as those of plants and ani- 
mals that are often met with in the daily environment. 

(4) Education should cultivate through specific training 
general emotional attitudes. Moods and feelings often are the 
dominant elements in a situation and these can readily be 
transferred, I believe. The child who has the proper emotional 
attitude toward his school life will be the one who will act most 
capably in the school environment. Education should see to it 
that such general feeling attitudes as docility, respect for author- 
ity, eagerness to be of service, and the like are developed through 
the school training. Such attitudes, unlike the ideals which Bag- 
ley emphasizes, need not (perhaps should not) be raised to full 
consciousness. This, I believe, has a bearing on moral instruc- 
tion in the schools. I have sometimes thought that intellectuliz- 
ing what ought to be an emotional attitude is a dangerous pro- 
cedure. This thought has significance in relation to temperance 
instruction and the like. I think that the question may well be 
raised, — Has not the instruction on the effect of alcohol and nar- 
cotics the tendency to make the child's attitude naerely a matter 
of intellect, when it should primarily remain one of feeling and 
of will? 

V. THE SUPERIOR DISCLIPLINARY VALUE OF 

PURE AS COMPARED WITH APPLIED SCIENCE. 

Finally, if it is true that a formal training is possible, and 
if it is desirable that the schools furnish such a training, we come 
back to the old question as to whether there are certain studies^ 
that are better suited than others to offer this discipline. It 



THE DOGMA OF FOEMAL DISCIPLINE 27 

would seem probable that there are subjects which either because 
of the nature of their subject matter, or because of the better tech- 
nique that goes with their instruction are today more valuable 
than others from the standpoint of mental training. Other 
studies which are not now so well developed will, perhaps, some 
day take the place of mathematics, or natural science, or foreign 
language, but today they are less valuable from a disciplinary 
standpoint. 

Just at present the most important controversy concerning 
educational values is being carried on between those who advocate 
the advantages of applied science and those who hold to the great- 
er value of pure science. The proper solution of the relative im- 
portance of the two spheres of human knowledge will doubtless 
have much to do with the development of the most valuable cur- 
riculum of studies in our secondary schools and colleges. I am 
inclined to believe that at least as far as mental discipline is 
concerned, pure science has much in its favor as a subject of 
instruction. In a forthcoming volume, Bagley emphasizes 
the probable superiority of pure mathematics over applied mat- 
hematics with its utilitarian ends which tend to color every other 
consideration; thus obscuring the ideals of accuracy and rigidity 
that the pure science teaches. "Applied mathematics", says 
Bagley, "will inevitably demand a quantity rather than qual- 
ity With the better and more intelligent students, the 

discipline may come in spite of haste. With the average student, 
the longer and more penetrating processes from which the percep- 
tion of the unique values of mathematical reasoning will emerge, 
will be omitted". 

What is true in regard to pure mathematics as compared 
with applied mathematics is, I believe, true in regard to other 
pure sciences as compared with other applied sciences. The ap- 
Ijlication of a science tends to emphasize certain human values 
more or less remote from the value of the science as science; 
hence, to restrict the field of the inquiry to those phases of the 
science that seem to relate most definitelv to economic and other 
more-or-less narrow human values. With this point of view the 
investigator is apt not only to lose the ideals of rigidity which 
Bagley points out, but also the ideal of truth merely as truth; 
truth that is self-sufficient and confident, that knows that what- 
ever is true is human and whatever is untrue or partially true can 
never have ultimate worth in human experience. This ideal 



28 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

gained in one pure science and made a conscious end of endeavor 
in all fields of human experience has a rich promise for the fu- 
ture. The great discoveries of science have been made by those 
who were primarily scientists, who had the scientific ideal. Ap- 
plied science comes later and uses the knowledge of a Helmholtz 
playing with the opthalmoscope or a Darwin, in the spirit of 
scientific curiosity, collecting specimens and data from which has 
developed the theory of evolution with its countless applications 
to human life. The mere facts of science are worth much; rela- 
tively less, however, in the first years of study before specializa- 
tion has begun in the technical school or university; but the fact 
as fact has slight disciplinary value unless from it grows the 
spirit of curiosity, the emotional ideal, which the Greeks realized 
gave birth to all knowledge, and through which modern education 
has achieved such results. My own conclusions would be that pure 
science is of greater disciplinary value because (1) through the 
facts which it presents, ideal of procedure and of truth may be de- 
veloped which function in a wider human experience, greatly to 
the uplift of the race; (2) the content and method of pure science 
is such that it has a broader field of application than has applied 
science, and can function as an identical or similar element in 
more situations than can applied science; (3) the emotion 
which the pure seeking after truth arouse is higher and 
less likely to be deadened by other emotions than are the ideals 
of economic improvement and social betterment, which are the 
aims of an applied science. These latter are apt to conflict with 
each other and to obscure the greater issue. Truth has but one 
aim, to know itself; it has a greater emotional uplift and is one 
of the fundamental passions of the human race; as fundamental 
as the economic and social needs, and capable of ranges of fliglir 
toward the ideal that are denied the other instinctive longings. 

We must realize that not every subject that has utilitarian 
value, or that excjtes popular interest, is for that reason solely, 
a fit subject for instruction in the schools. Ultra-conservatism 
has too often insisted in keeping in the curriculum those studies 
tliat have long since ceased to be vital; on the other iiand we are 
equally in danger, particularly at the present moment, of going to 
the other and equally fatal extreme. There are so many special 
interests that just now seem to be clamoring for recognition, prac- 
tical, humanitarian, aesthetic, that our school programmes are 
in danger of being over-crowded with a variety of subjects w^hich 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 29 

cannot vxell take the place in point of mental training of tiiose 
which liave for years been firmly established in the curri- 
culum. The very multiplicity of the subjects that have enriched 
our programmes offers a distraction and furnishes a training in 
dispersed rather than concentrated attention, a training which is 
not needed and should not be desired. The trend of popular opin- 
ion is such that the new must come in, and I am far from main- 
taining that this opinion is not on the whole sound ; but let us see 
to it that this new element is assigned its proper place and given 
its just value. In this time of rapid change we need sanity in 
educational doctrine and practice as scarcely ever before. 




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